

Message Text

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ACTION PM-04

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ACDA-07 MC-02 IO-13 IGA-02
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SS-15 USIA-06 AID-05 DHA-02 XMB-02 /099 W
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R 140732Z JUL 77

FM AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1069

INFO AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

AMEMBASSY HELSINKI

USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY OSLO

AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK

CINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 STOCKHOLM 2948

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MASS, SW

SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF US SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS FOR FY 1979

REF: STATE 133136

1. THE GOVERNMENT OF SWEDEN IS NOT A PROPOSED RECIPIENT OF US SECURITY ASSISTANCE IN FY 1979. CONSEQUENTLY, STOCKHOLM IS LISTED CORRECTLY IN REFTEL AS AN INFO ADDRESSEE. NEVERTHELESS, BECAUSE SWEDEN IS A CONSISTENT PURCHASER OF MAJOR US DEFENSE EQUIPMENT THROUGH BOTH FMS AND COMMERCIAL SALES AND, OF GREATER CONSIDERATION, BECAUSE OF THE VITAL ROLE SWEDISH DEFENSE EFFORTS PLAY IN NORTHERN FLANK SECURITY, THE EMBASSY BELIEVES IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO TRANSMIT THE FOLLOWING ASSESSMENT OF US INTERESTS SERVED THROUGH MAINTENANCE OF OUR TRADITIONAL PROCUREMENT RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SWEDISH MILITARY. THE EMBASSY UNDERSTANDS THIS APPROACH HAS BEEN SUGGESTED BY DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS RESPONSIBLE
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FOR COORDINATING THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
FOR FY 1979.

2. THE RESPONSES WHICH FOLLOW BELOW ARE KEYED TO
THE PARAGRAPH NUMBERS CONTAINED IN REFTEL.

3. SWEDEN OCCUPIES A STRATEGICALLY SIGNIFICANT

POSITION ON NATO'S NORTHERN FLANK. NORTHERN SWEDEN, TOGETHER WITH NORTHERN FINLAND, LIES EXPOSED TO SEIZURE BY SOVIET FORCES SEEKING TO STRENGTHEN SOVIET CONTROL OVER THE ICE FREE SEA PASSAGES FROM THE MURMANSK/KOLA PENINSULA NAVAL AND MISSILE COMPLEX PAST THE NORTH CAPE INTO THE NORTHERN ATLANTIC. WITH DENMARK, SWEDEN DOMINATES THE NARROW BALTIC EXIT TO THE NORTH SEA. SWEDEN IS AN INDUSTRIALIZED NATION WITH A HIGHLY DEVELOPED ARMS INDUSTRY. SWEDEN IS NOT A SIGNATORY TO ANY INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AGREEMENTS; HOWEVER, SWEDEN HAS CONCLUDED DATA EXCHANGE AGREEMENTS PROVIDING FOR THE EXCHANGE OF MILITARY AND TECHNOLOGICAL INFORMATION WITH THE UNITED STATES. THE AGREEMENTS PROVIDE SWEDEN WITH ACCESS TO SOPHISTICATED US AIRCRAFT ENGINES, AVIONICS, AND OTHER ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY CRITICALLY IMPORTANT TO SWEDEN'S DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY. SWEDEN PURCHASES ON AN FMS CASH BASIS OR DIRECT FROM CONTRACTOR BASIS SEVERAL US WEAPONS SYSTEMS AND/OR COMPONENTS. SWEDEN PURSUES A POLICY OF NON-ALIGNMENT IN PEACETIME AND NEUTRALITY DURING WARTIME. TO LEND CREDIBILITY TO THIS POLICY, SWEDEN MAINTAINS A MODERN MILITARY FORCE EQUIPPED WITH SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS. US OBJECTIVES FOR SWEDEN'S MILITARY FORCES ARE THAT THEY BE SUFFICIENT TO PRESERVE AN INDEPENDENT NON-ALIGNED SWEDEN FAVORABLY DISPOSED TOWARD COOPERATION WITH THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY THEREBY FORECLOSING THE EXTENSION OF SOVIET MILITARY POWER TO SWEDISH TERRITORY. A FURTHER OBJECTIVE IS THAT NEUTRAL SWEDEN AS THE STRONGEST

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POWER IN THE NORDIC AREA CONTINUE AS A BUFFER BETWEEN THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES AND NATO COUNTRIES ON THE NORTHERN FLANK.

4.A. THE SWEDISH GOVERNMENT PERCEIVES THAT THE MAJOR THREAT TO ITS TERRITORY IS FROM THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES. THEY VIEW THE INCREASE IN WP CONVENTIONAL ARMS, ESPECIALLY IN THE KOLA PENINSULAR AREA, WITH CONCERN. THEY BELIEVE THIS THREAT CAN BE BEST MET BY THEIR CONCEPT OF TOTAL DEFENSE WITH A CREDIBLE MODERN ARMED FORCE IN BEING. THE SWEDES FULLY REALIZE THEY COULD NOT OPPOSE SUCCESSFULLY A FULL-SCALE ATTACK BY THE WP NATIONS. HOWEVER, THEY REASON THAT WITH A MODERN ARMED FORCE EQUIPPED WITH SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS THEY CAN INFLICT HEAVY LOSSES UPON A POTENTIAL AGGRESSOR. THEY REASON THAT SUCH A STRATEGY WILL DETER AGGRESSION. THIS EMBASSY BASICALLY AGREES WITH THIS THREAT ASSESSMENT AND THE STRATEGY DEVELOPED TO COMBAT IT.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 STOCKHOLM 2948

4.B. N/A

4.C. THE SWEDISH MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT IS BASED ON
UNIVERSAL CONSCRIPTION AND TOTAL MOBILIZATION. THE
SCENARIO FOR POSSIBLE AGGRESSION AGAINST THEM WOULD
PROBABLY NOT ALLOW TIME FOR TOTAL MOBILIZATION,
ESPECIALLY OF THE ARMY. THE MILITARY DOES, HOWEVER,
MAINTAIN UNITS WHICH CAN BE CONSIDERED TO BE IN A
MOBILIZED STATUS. SPECIFICALLY, THEY ARE THE AIR FORCE
ATTACK WING, NAVY TORPEDO BOATS AND SUBMARINES AND THE
COAST ARTILLERY BATTERIES. THE SWEDISH MILITARY IS
EQUIPPED WITH SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS SYSTEMS AND IS
DEFENSE ORIENTED. WHILE RELATIVELY COSTLY TO THE SWEDES
(3.1 PERCENT OF GNP), THIS TYPE OF MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT
SERVES US INTERESTS.

4.D. THE SWEDISH GOVERNMENT IS NEGOTIATING TO PROCURE
THE HARPOON WEAPONS SYSTEM AND TOW ANTI-TANK MISSILES.
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UPGRADING OF THE PREVIOUSLY PROVIDED HAWK SURFACE-TO-AIR
MISSILE, THE MAVERICK AIR-TO-GROUND MISSILE AND NEGOTIATIONS
FOR PROCUREMENT OF THE SIDEWINDER AIR-TO-AIR MISSILE

WILL CONTINUE. THE SWEDISH MILITARY DESIRES THE LATEST VERSION OF THE SIDEWINDER (AIM9L) BUT HAVE BEEN CLEARED THUS FAR ONLY FOR PURCHASE OF THE AIM9H. SWEDEN WILL CONTINUE TO SEND OFFICERS TO US SERVICE AND SPECIAL SCHOOLS. ALL CASES ARE FMS CASH SALES. SWEDEN WILL ALSO CONTINUE TO PURCHASE MILITARY COMPONENTS DIRECT FROM US CONTRACTORS. PROCUREMENT OF THESE WEAPONS SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS AND THE US TRAINING ARE CONSIDERED BY THE EMBASSY TO SERVE US INTERESTS.

4.E. THE SWEDISH ECONOMY, THOUGH PRESENTLY STRAINED BY A DEFICIT TRADE BALANCE, HIGH PRODUCTION COST AND INFLATION, IS BASICALLY STRONG. THE MAINTENANCE OF A RELATIVELY EXPENSIVE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT IS WELL WITHIN SWEDISH ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CAPABILITIES.

4.F. THE ONLY USG OR CIVILIAN CONTRACT PERSONNEL THAT WILL BE REQUIRED IN COUNTRY AS A RESULT OF MILITARY SALES TO SWEDEN WOULD BE OCCASIONAL VISITS BY SITE SURVEY TEAMS, ETC. NO PROBLEMS ARE ANTICIPATED FROM THEIR PRESENCE.

4.G. COMPARABLE WEAPONS SYSTEMS COULD BE PRODUCED LOCALLY BY THE RATHER EXTENSIVE AND SOPHISTICATED SWEDISH DEFENSE INDUSTRIES BUT AT A GREATLY INCREASED COST, DUE PRIMARILY TO THE R&D THAT WOULD BE INVOLVED. SIMILAR WEAPONS SYSTEMS AND TRAINING ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FROM OTHER COUNTRIES, PRIMARILY FRANCE AND ENGLAND. SWEDEN IS QUITE LIKELY TO USE THESE OTHER SOURCES IF UNABLE TO PROCURE US EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING. SWEDEN WOULD NOT RPT NOT UTILIZE WP COUNTRY SOURCES FOR MILITARY EQUIPMENT OR
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TRAINING.

4.H. WHILE OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE NORDIC AREA HAVE SIMILAR WEAPONS SYSTEMS, SWEDEN IS CONSIDERED THE BEST EQUIPPED MILITARILY. SWEDISH MILITARY CAPABILITY IS CONSIDERED BY OTHER NORDIC COUNTRIES AS A STABILIZING ELEMENT IN THE AREA AND A SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION IN SWEDISH MILITARY CAPABILITY WOULD BE REGARDED AS DESTABILIZING.

4.I. SWEDEN IS CONSIDERED A LEADER IN THE AREA OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND THEREFORE WELCOMES THE USG STAND ON HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES. THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM WILL HAVE NO EFFECT ON THIS SWEDISH STANCE.

4.J. ALTHOUGH A MAJOR PRODUCER OF ARMS, SWEDEN HAS VERY STRICT REGULATIONS CONCERNING THEIR EXPORT. SWEDEN WILL NOT SELL TO COUNTRIES ENGAGED OR LIKELY TO BE ENGAGED IN A CONFLICT OR TO REGIMES CONSIDERED

OPPRESSIVE. SWEDEN IS ALSO A LEADER IN ADVOCATING
DISARMAMENT AND CAN THEREFORE BE EXPECTED TO COOPERATE
CLOSELY WITH THE US ON THIS ISSUE.

4.K. N/A.
PERRY

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